

Policy Strategy Paper on Regional Protection Force Under UNMISS-Plus' Mandate in the Republic of South Sudan

Theme:

**South Sudan: The Imperative of Proactive and Smart Diplomacy for Constructive Engagement with the Region and World at Large
To Implement the ARCISS Effectively**

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INTRODUCTION

□ **Objective:**

- To reach a consensus on accepting the Regional Protection Force (RPF) within the UNMISS-Plus' Mandate but with request to UNSC and IGAD-Plus to consider the advantage of joint operation with TGoNU's security sector; and also to incorporate government's views into the envisaged renewal of the mandate in December 2016, including assistance for reinforcement of transparency and accountability in the use of public resources in the Republic of South Sudan.

□ **Approach:**

- Engagement, Dialogue and Cooperation with the RPF and UNMISS to make positive gains within the Supplementary limited mandate accorded to them, linked to overall Complementary TGoNU's Mandate and Reinvigoration, especially the Stabilization Rapprochement and Safeguards of People's Needs and Aspirations for Life of Happiness and Prosperity in South Sudan.

□ **Methodology:**

1. Presentation on Sequence of Facts that Provoked Additional Foreign Intervention into South Sudan.
2. Presentation on Cons and Pros of Foreign Intervention into South Sudan.
3. Presentation on the Way Forward for Safeguarding Stabilization and Prosperity of South Sudan within UNMISS-Plus' Mandate.
4. Comments, Questions and Recommendations.

1. SEQUENCE OF FACTS THAT PROVOKED ADDITIONAL FOREIGN INTERVENTION INTO SOUTH SUDAN

Where Did the Idea of RPF Emanated From?

- Recurrent destructive leadership conflicts, triggered again by Presidential and Vice-Presidential Guards in Juba on 8th July 2016 followed by heavy military engagements in residential areas, all negating the agreed permanent ceasefire and security arrangements. The effects of the aftermath of these have gone beyond toleration and with more burdens of exodus of population, especially on the frontline states and traditional overseas partners, donors and friends.
- **56th Extraordinary Session of IGAD's Council of Ministers (Nairobi, July 10th and 11th 2016) which resolved that:**
 1. President Salva Kiir Mayardit and First Vice President Dr. Riek Machar Teny should prevail upon their respective military commanders and declare ceasefire.
 2. Juba International Airport should be re-opened under UNMISS protection.
 3. Humanitarian aid corridors and workers should not be obstructed or left unprotected.
 4. UNMISS Mandate needs to be revised to incorporate an intervention brigade and increase number of troops from the region to, *inter alia*, secure Juba.
 5. Identify, investigate and bring to Book the perpetrators of human rights violations and the unleashers of unprecedented havocs in Juba.
 6. Security arrangements as well as the entire ARCISS provisions should be implemented efficaciously as agreed by the parties.
 7. IGAD to remain seized to the matter until it is resolved.

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- **Report by JMEC's Chairperson**, diagnosing that 'who matters most' in South Sudanese politics is the leader surrounded by well-armed supporters, ready for evil acts for the sake of power interest. The non-combatants are less respected in this situation.
- **Report by Special Representative of UN Secretary-General and Head of UNMISS** with complaints that combat capacity of the UNMISS is below the required 'gunboat diplomacy' standards of peacekeeper in a volatile situation like South Sudan.
- **Report by Executive Secretary of IGAD, and by Regional Chiefs of Defense Staff/Forces (CDS/Fs)**, persuading the region and international community to deploy to Juba a pacification force from Africa and give the Africans segment within UNMISS some superior arms and surveillance technology to accomplish the tasks effectively.
- **IGAD-Plus Extraordinary Session of Heads of State and Government at the sideline of the AU Summit in (Kigali, 16th July 2016) with attendance of UN Secretary-General and AU Chairperson himself as well as other heads of state and dignitaries from the five regions of Africa**, endorsing IGAD Council of Ministers' Communiqué and Ki-moon's arm embargo and additional sanctions on peace spoilers and obstructers of humanitarian relief delivery in South Sudan. Later on 18th July 2016 the AU Summit endorsed a deployment of a third party regional pacification force in collaboration with UN. While these was happening Dr. Riek Machar and his supporters kept calling for quick deployment of regional force in Juba for his return. President Salva Kiir Mayardit, issued an ultimatum on 21st July 2016 for the First Vice President Dr. Riek to return to Juba within 48-hours, and traveled to Entebbe on 23rd to consult with Yoweri Museveni who advised for negotiation of mandate, identity and size of the regional force rather than outright rejection.
- **President Kiir relieved Dr. Riek on 25th July 2016 (based on ARCISS Chapter I, Article 6.4 on FVP post vacancy "for any reason" and replacement recommendation by SPLM/A-IO leadership in Juba) for Gen. Taban Deng Gai.**

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- ❑ **The CDS/Fs met again in Addis Ababa on 29th July 2016 to deliberate on planning and strategic operation for the authorized regional forces in liaison with JMEC and UNMISS, and making use of Ethiopian and Rwandan battalions who are already on the ground, while working to bridge the gap of their military capability in terms of superior armaments and supplies (including air defense and intelligence surveillance technology).**
- ❑ **The JMEC's Partners met urgently on 31st July 2016 in Khartoum, co-chaired by Foreign Minister of the Sudan and Chinese Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, and resolved that:**
 1. *The future of South Sudan deserves safeguard by all,*
 2. *Deployment of third party foreign force quickly to protect civilians, get back Dr. Machar to Juba, and resume ARCISS implementation.*
 3. *SPLM/A-IG must cease hunting Dr. Riek Machar and his forces around Juba and in other parts of Equatoria and should speed up establishment of cantonment areas as agreed.*
 4. *Urgent extraordinary 2nd Summit of IGAD-Plus Heads of State and Government to authorize a way forward for urgent action on the situation of South Sudan.*
- ❑ **Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin, conducted a press conference in Addis Ababa On 1st August 2016, announcing his resignation and citing collapse of ARCISS and restrictions of political space in South Sudan as the main reason, but leaving options opened for coalescing outside with like-minded change-makers and calling for quick deployment of third party regional force, and National Democratic Dialogue.**
- ❑ **Secretary-General of the SPLM and the leader of SPLM leaders (Former Detainees), Mr. Pagan Amum, on 3rd August 2016 launched "South Sudan Reborn", calling for foreign intervention and 'UN trusteeship' for South Sudan helped by technocrats who could establish strong institutions that would promote good governance, democracy and human rights in the country.**

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- **On 5th August 2016 the IGAD-Plus 2nd Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government, convened in Addis Ababa and adopted a 21-points Communiqué** (with TGoNU position in point 13: *a. Accepts in principle RPF for IDPs, humanitarian agencies and JMEC; b. composition, mandate, armament, deployment, timing and funding shall be agreed upon by the TGoNU and troop contributing countries; c. leadership changes in SPLM/A-IO is solely an internal matter and the region should work with the current setup of the TGoNU*), including authorization of CDSF/Fs to negotiate and implement the rest of details in coordination with the UNMISS and TGoNU and that AU Commission Chairperson urgently transmits the communiqué to UN Secretary General and, through him, to UNSC and AU Peace and Security Council for action. The Summit encouraged Dr Riek and President Salva as well as people of South Sudan to embrace long lasting peace in their country, and welcomed the gesture of Gen. Taban to step down with a view of returning to the *status quo ante* in line with the ARCISS.
- **The SPLM Leaders – FPDs released a statement in Addis Ababa on 8th August 2016** encouraging RPF to provide enabling environment for ARCISS implementation and healthy political dialogue (*including an All-Party Roundtable Conference*). TGoNU released a response on the same date rejecting the U.S. Draft Resolution in the UNSC, calling it “*regime change agenda*” after “*invasion of South Sudan*” in order to put it under “*UN Protectorate Status*”. The same position has been uttered previously by some demonstrators in Juba and other towns.
- **AU PSC in its meeting on 11th August 2016**, endorsed all regional resolutions on South Sudan and urged the leaders to embrace mutual trust, put interest of the country and people above everything else, and implement the ARCSS. It also called for an urgent in-depth independent investigation by AU on the fighting that took place in Juba and identify the culprits and bring them to Book. It requested AU Commission in consultation with UN to look into best mechanisms for timely and effective action to address large scale mass atrocities in line with the relevant provisions of the AU Constitutive Act and the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council, and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

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- **The UNSC passed the Resolution Number 2304 in New York on 12th August 2016 approving a ceiling of 17,000 UNMISS forces (including 4,000 RPF) with a new mandate to “use all necessary means” to:**
 1. safeguard movements and communication within and outside Juba,
 2. protect Juba airport and other life-line installations in the city,
 3. engaging combatively any armed actor who prepares or attacks civilians (both nationals and foreigners) and temper with the work of UNMISS and aid workers as well as other international actors in South Sudan.
- **N.B: The Resolution has an attachment of arm embargo and more sanctions to be imposed if the warring parties fail to cooperate and comply quickly. It also renewed the previous overall UNMISS Mandate (1. Protection of civilians, 2. Monitoring and investigation of human rights, 3. Creation of conducive conditions for delivery of humanitarian assistance, 4. Support of the Implementation of the Peace Agreement).**
- **The Preparation to kick off by 31st August 2016 (i.e PCTSA Workshop) so that the actual RPF mission could kick off by 30th September 2016 in accordance with efficacy of the provisions of ARCSS’ Chapter II, especially Article(5) that provides for redeployment of unauthorized armed forces outside a radius of 25km from the center of Juba by 15 September 2016 with exception of Guard Forces (i.e, Presidential and other VIPs, Military Barracks, Bases and Warehouses with light weapons) and Joint Integrated Police, whose operation is managed at Joint Operation Center (JOC) staffed by representatives from national security forces and CTSAMM, all under one chain of command. It is within this mechanism the government is given opportunity to put across its views and inserts its interests within UNMISS-Plus.**
- **President Salva Kiir in his inaugural address during the opening of expanded and reconstituted TNLA on 15th August 2016 said that his government is not rejecting the UNSC Resolution but only want to be consulted and informed in advance for the sake of strengthening rather than diminishing its authority and responsibility in South Sudan.**

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- **All the above sequences of facts are justified on ARCISS' provisions, especially Chapter II:**

Article (5.4):

“Security for personal protection may be sourced from external forces if the Parties require it, but shall operate alongside, and cooperate with, the security forces of South Sudan”.

Article (5.5):

“Avoidance of conflict between the activities conducted by the security forces permitted to remain in Juba shall be conducted at a Joint Operations Centre (JOC), staffed by representatives from National Security forces and CTSAMM”,

- CTSAMM comprises IGAD 3 (including Chairperson), GRSS 3, SPLM/A-IO 3, and 1 each from FPDs, Other Political Parties, Women's Bloc, Civil Society Organizations, Youth, Eminent Personalities, AU, China, Troika, UNMISS, IGAD Partners Forum and EU.
- **Why did the Region and International Community Acted Fast on South Sudan?**

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- ❑ **The Implications of the depicting intractable war situation on their backyards, especially with Resolution 2252 (2015) that determined the situation in South Sudan as a threat to international peace and security in the region while the announced sanctions against the identified past perpetrators remain largely ineffective together with other UNSC numerous resolutions and regional communiqués: about 2.6 million people are displaced and 6 million more put on humanitarian life-support from 2013 to 2016 (with ¼ million children facing acute malnutrition), causing burdens on the region and international community while warring leaders continue to purchase expensive military hardware for consolidating their parochial power privileges. The urban battles that took place inside Juba on 7th, 8th and 11th July 2016 caused huge losses of lives, destruction of properties, massive displacement of civilian populations from their residences, rapes of women and young girls ((e.g. Terrain Hotel Camp and UNMISS' PoC episodes of raping foreign aids workers and IDPs), massive drop out of pupils and students from schools and universities (e.g. 6,000 students from Juba University alone), targeting of diplomatic personnel (e.g., spraying bullets on an armored U.S. Diplomatic Car), firing into UNMISS compounds and killing/wounding IDPs and some Chinese peace-keepers, attacking some aid workers and seizing their assets, looting humanitarian stores and valuables (e.g., WFP Warehouse and ICRC store in Juba) and increasing economic hardships with inflation and prices skyrocketing above 600%.**
- ❑ **The Timing of the 2nd SPLM/A's leadership fictionalization crisis in Juba, in addition to previous negative reports and intense international media coverage on attacks on UNMISS' PoC in Malakal and Crisis of Wau and many parts of Equatoria (including the sexual abuse on aid workers in Terrain Hotel Complex).**
- ❑ **The U.S. and its allies, including UNSG Ban Ki-moon, taking the lead of lobbying and pressuring regional and international actors to contain the nauseating situation of South Sudan ASAP.**
- ❑ **The endangered front-line states interests in South Sudan and AU's pledge to end intractable armed conflicts in Africa by 2020.**

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❑ **Why Ineffectiveness in Enforcement of the Previous UNMISS Mandate?**

- Quality of UNMISS personnel and where they are drawn from might be questionable.
- The deterrent and combat capability of the UNMISS might be below power standards.
- Fear of loss of peacekeepers' precious lives and their compensation might be at play.

❑ **The UNMISS-Plus and specific RPF Mandate is not contradictory and could be treated as supplementary to TGoNU Mandate in ARCISS, Chapter II, Article (2):**

1. Implement ARCISS and restore peace, security and stability in the country;
2. Expedite the relief, protection, voluntary and dignified repatriation, rehabilitation and resettlement of IDPs and returnees;
3. Facilitate and oversee a process of national reconciliation and healing through an independent mechanism in accordance with ARCISS provisions, including budgetary compensation and reparations;
4. Oversee and ensure a successful Permanent Constitution-making;
5. Work closely with IGAD-PLUS Member States and Organizations and other partners and friends of South Sudan to consolidate peace and stability in the country;
6. Reform public financial management;
7. Ensure prudent, transparent and accountable management of national wealth and resources to build the nation and promote the welfare of the people;
8. Carry out normal functions of government;
9. Rehabilitate and reform the civil service;
10. Implement security sector reforms and security sector transformation;
11. Rebuild the destroyed physical infrastructure in conflict-affected areas and give special attention to prioritizing the rebuilding of livelihoods of those affected by the conflict;
12. Establish a competent and impartial National Elections Commission (NEC) to conduct free and fair Elections before the end of the Transitional Period and ensure that the outcome is broadly reflective of the will of the electorate;
13. Make all efforts to conduct National Population and Housing Census before the end of the Transitional Period, but not compulsory for elections;
14. Devolve more powers and resources to States' and County levels.

2. PROS AND CONS OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION INTO SOUTH SUDAN

❑ **Pros of Foreign Intervention:**

- ❖ Preventing the unnecessary additional loss of lives, properties and dignified livelihood by stopping the wide spread anarchy of warlords, fanatics and criminals who are hiding un-accounted and un-apprehended under armed forces uniforms, state apparatus and bushes in in South Sudan.
- ❖ Pacifying, separating and protecting the legitimate leaders, civilians and major life-line installations in the country, including foreigners who have interests to pursue in South Sudan but got evacuated as their work and investments came to an abrupt halt (e.g, Japanese, Chinese, Norwegians, Germans, Dutch, Canadians, Russians and other countries working on water, dams, roads, bridges, mining, oil, agriculture and other projects).
- ❖ Enforcing the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” vulnerable non-combatants in accordance with international humanitarian law, and creating a buffer zone between the rival forces or disarming some of them so that they are denied further opportunity to provoke more deadly clashes and painful inflictions on the already low nation’s morale.
- ❖ Creating a conducive environment for the ARCISS stakeholders to regain the lost confidence and focus on re-setting TGoNU to manage effectively the issues of state and nation building in a peaceful and reformed manner, while working seriously to solicit international assistance from friends and allies who are willing to help South Sudan to address its hard-times of security, economic, humanitarian and governance crises (both in short, middle and long terms).

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- ❖ Proving South Sudan as a success story in regional engagement for resolving internal conflicts in Africa without giving in to disappointments and frustrations of the sophisticated regional and world's politics and pursuit of selective interests. *For example, half of Juba International Airport has been under control of UNMISS for the last five years and no suspicious activities of a regime change has been genuinely detected. The air space of oil production areas in Greater Upper Nile has been under surveillance of Sudan and it was not seen as a threat to sovereignty of the Republic of South Sudan but cooperation until the new country comes to stand on its own later.*
- ❖ Learning to design specific foreign policies towards different countries and regional blocs, both at good times of friendships and bad times of confrontations, and presenting this as a successful historical experience in future for human interdependence (even in the military arenas).
- ❖ Avoiding confrontation with foreigners, especially the front-line countries because South Sudan needs them. For example, losing Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan and Djibouti could hamper the access to international ports and markets while the new country is totally landlocked.
- ❖ Deterring the warring parties to honor by practice their declared commitment to ARCISS implementation and the reform agenda in all sectors (with priority given to security sector), and enticing TGoNU to adopt constructive engagement approach with international institutions charged with maintaining world's peace, security, international law and order, and values of humanity.

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- ❖ Diffusing the real or perceived ethnic tensions and divisions that have emerged from sense of entitlement for the country by some citizens or feelings of not being protected and care for by the government. Here the foreigners could assist in restoring the needed trust in universal safety of the people of South Sudan, their leaders and properties. *Example: during the tough moments of the crisis in South Sudan foreigners were more trusted to crisscross tribal barriers peacefully when the nationals found difficult to do so.*
- ❖ Helping in creating an enabling environment for pursuit of transitional justice, reconciliation and unity of leaders and the people of South Sudan so as to restore the lost dignity and plan for progress and development of South Sudan. *Example: History proves that truth-telling by the rivals could be made possible by a genuine third-party mediator who has both powers of sticks and carrots.*
- ❖ Helping in ensuring a neutral environment for conduct of genuine democratic elections in the country so that any armed force allied to a particular political party or an individual politician is deterred from bullying opponents in leadership competition for ruling the people of South Sudan.
- ❖ Making a good name internationally by working jointly and successfully with foreign military personnel, and giving them an appreciative farewell of friendly relations after having accomplished their mission in collaboration with the TGoNU. *Example, Rwandans did it to the admiration of humanity after they turned the genocide history into development opportunities for their less developed country in Africa.*

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■ **CONS OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION:**

- ❖ Traps of testing the viability of GRSS cooperation with the region and the entire international community. Too many UNSC Resolutions and regional communiqués on South Sudan are bad omens to sovereignty, especially when attached with arms embargo and sanctions.
- ❖ Making South Sudan looks like regional and international war theatre for settling the conflicting foreign interests. *Examples: U.S might be interested in geopolitical gains, Kenya might be pursuing its big economic investment interests, Uganda might be doing the same for its small traders and for monitoring LRA., Ethiopia could be acting out of solidarity with its ethnic groups whose cousins are affected by recurrent conflict in South Sudan.*
- ❖ Gambling with future of the Republic of South Sudan where the government won't be any longer in total control of whatever comes in or goes out from the country; confirming a status of 'ceremonial sovereignty' under proxy UN-AU-IGAD administration or call it trusteeship.
- ❖ More foreign intervention signifies vote of no-confidence in leaders and people of South Sudan to manage their internal affairs independently with civility. The 2013 deadly war and 2016 clashes were sparked by heavily armed Presidential Guards who are loyal to either Salva Kiir or Dr. Riek Machar. Hence, there is no guarantee that fighting will not start again if the two principals are forced to come together again in Juba under UNMISS-Plus' and RPF watch.

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- ❖ Since there is no permanency of friendships in international relations except that of pursuit of interest itself, the intervening troops may not be impartial as they work to promote the interests of countries that have hired them or financed their mission. This may cause more devastations like what is happening in Syria between U.S and Russia whose imperialist tendencies have prevailed negatively as a catalyst for 'regime-change bias'. Other Examples: French and Laurant Gbagbo vs Allasane Ouatara in Cote d'Ivoire, U.S and Ali Mahdi vs General Farah Aydeed in Somalia as well as Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and NATO and Gaddafi in Libya.
- ❖ Some tendencies of dirty politicking might not be ruled out from the foreign intervening force. This could be too expensive to afford, especially under a situation of tense security, collapsed economy, humanitarian catastrophe, international sanctions and diplomatic isolation.
- ❖ Foreigners come with prejudices to target the biggest ethnic groups in the country while siding with minorities even when they are on the wrong side. This could polarize South Sudan further and erode opportunities for reconciliation and national solidarity, good faith and goodwill.
- ❖ Leaving behind a messy trail of destruction, immoralities, diseases, ethnic divisions and fragmentations, uncontrollable warlords and more deaths after exiting the country due failure to accomplish the presumptive mission, as it happened elsewhere in countries that were destroyed beyond repair by UN and AU interventions and impositions.

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- ❖ Existence of multiple military forces with different chains of commands in South Sudan implies additional insecurity. Military endeavors are very expensive in terms of resources and lives. Any violent clash with the foreign troops in South would mean undesirable more spilling of blood. This will raise the level of animosities, especially with the radicals from both sides. Also a combat force can't keep peace, particularly in a situation where it is perceived as an imposter.
- ❖ Foreign intervention signifies impatience with procedures and pecking order of a sovereign state. It weakens and diminishes the needed political viability and power discipline in South Sudan. Many stable countries today had undergone similar conflicts as experienced now by South Sudan but were given a chance to settle their issues alone. UNSC's P5 were not built on good news either.
- ❖ Military intervention is never good news to free and fair democracy because its essence is dictatorship, be it in the name of UN, AU, IGAD or any country that wants to disseminate democratic ideals globally. Hence, presence of a foreign military force in South Sudan is a bullying strategy to the government.
- ❖ Foreign force might invoke cynicism on good relations among the neighboring countries, the region and the world at large. If things turn ugly due to superiority complex and 'savior behavior' of outsiders, South Sudan could be expelled from AU, IGAD, EAC, Northern Corridor, COMESA and UN Institutions, putting the country into an awkward losing situation among the dignified world's nations.

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■ **Remarks on Pros and Cons of Foreign Intervention:**

1. Allowing traps is succumbing to being preyed on, both internally and externally with mistrust and nausea.
2. Military pacification and intervention connote an on-going fighting which is no longer seen in Juba but whose possibility can't be ruled out.
3. Rwandans and Ethiopians have been in UNMISS. Their combat capacity is what will be new for the in-coming RPF.
4. Remedial actions authorized by JMEC Leadership are seriously needed to reset the ARCSS after the delay and all the fragrant violations it went through.
5. Joint foreign intervention and support was behind the independence of South Sudan, the M23 neutralization in DRC, the institutions building in Liberia, and governance empowerment in East Timor. These have had positive outcomes in those countries.
6. International relations involve smart and diplomatic politicking. This requires toleration, patience and credibility; not heroic emotional arrogance and propaganda.
7. Cooperation and dialogue could be the best guarantee to neutralize bad intentions and feelings of superiority by foreigners.
8. Revitalizing ARCISS and implementing it sincerely could give South Sudan a second chance to rise and prosper with the rest of stable nations.
9. The state should not at any instant forfeit its duty on 'Social Contract'. It should employ Dialogue more than militarism in responding to difficult situations so that more complications are not unnecessarily invited.
10. Justice should be prioritized without fear or favor, including trials of those found guilty of massive corruption scandals in South Sudan.
11. Distancing armed forces from electioneering politics reduces bloody leadership conflicts.
12. Good ending is always desirable. It deletes a bad beginning and makes a pleasing record of the value of history of human civilization.

3. THE WAY FORWARD FOR SAFEGUARDING STABILIZATION AND PROSPERITY OF SOUTH SUDAN WITHIN UNMISS-PLUS AND RPF MANDATE.

- The TGoNU and all the people of South Sudan need to internalize why the UNSC Resolution 2304 (2016) is necessary, including the sequence of aggressive high level international shuttles diplomacy with numerous communiqués and resolutions aimed at arresting the despairing situation and on consensus to assist in restoring security and peace to the embattled new country on the globe. They should welcome UNMISS-Plus with its new RPF segment (manned by CDS/Fs) as an appreciation of the fact that the external world is not ready yet to abandon South Sudan in the cold. They should positively and imperatively embrace engagement, dialogues and cooperation with the existing and the incoming additional foreign forces and join hands with them around harvesting interests of ARCISS holistic implementation for the good of the downtrodden people of South Sudan whose image has been tarnished from being the well-respected freedom fighters for a just cause to a monstrous laughing stock pursuing an insensitive mixed war of ‘known’ and ‘unknown gunmen’. They should also start acknowledging and respecting the JMEC leadership’s competence powers on overall supervision and remedies of ARCISS during the transition period as this is not written on the rock.
- The TGoNU has the utmost responsibility and duty to improve urgently the physical security and moral trust, governance leadership and confidence, population return and resettlement, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, economic and financial management, institutional reforms and transformation, transitional justice with focus on reconciliation and healing, constitution making and devolution of powers, legitimate democratization and government succession, international good working relations and imaging, and credible population and household census; all conducted within umpire of rule of law and dignified transparent and accountable civility, accompanied by more carrots reward to enjoy and less punitive sticks to abhor.

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- Cease from fanatic threats or propagandist rhetoric and work pragmatically to neutralize the very nauseating situation that attracted the foreign intervention. Re-build trust, good political will and national unity in leaders and people of South Sudan to convince the UNSC-AU-IGAD with its RPF component to invoke an early exit from the country. Oppressive and fragrant violations of the basic rights of citizenship (*e.g travel bans, cancellation of passports, un-procedural dismissal from top government posts, erroneous judgments and decisions, negative discrimination, name-tarnishing propaganda, etc*) are detrimental to maturity of spirit of national unity and the needed glue of the nation's fabrics and morale boosts. The disunity, mutual mistrust and multi-fronts hardships on the population will not serve rejection of additional foreign forces, especially with imposed arm embargo and more targeted sanctions speeding up doom of the new Republic into the abyss, God forbids!
- Peace and security are fundamental for moving forward and booming other dignified factors of good livelihoods in South Sudan and the neighbors. The TGoNU should to demonstrate that it is not promoting interest of few in expense of masses. It is in the best interest of political leaders to prioritize re-branding of their legitimacy as a government of the people, and sticking to the second chance and opportunities offered by ARCISS and the UNMISS-Plus Mandates. If managed well with diplomatic rigor and wisdom, RPF could turn out to be beneficial for all South Sudanese as it may give them a better space for a fresh breath and correct thinking about the future of their country and their common stake in it (including conducive environment for a sincere Nation's Building Dialogue).
- Since CDS/Fs, JMEC and UNMISS are supposed to engage TGoNU by 31st August 2016 with reference to 2011 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and Chapter VII of UN Charter by virtue of UNSC Resolution Number 1996 (2011) as well as to ARCISS, it is better to cooperate for their unrestricted and non-negotiable shipments of superior armament capability, including modern surveillance technology. Prior Consultation doesn't apply unless informally via friendship.

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- **Intransigence and heroic negative emotions is not be advisable in midst of more animosities than friendships (internally and externally),** because the TGoNU could pay dearly the price of backlashes of reckless and incoherent responses to sensitive and sophisticated foreign relations issues involving militarism, especially with involvement of frontline states who have stakes in internal affairs of the new country (be it bilateral through direct links or multilateral through integrated bodies like IGAD, EAC, Northern Corridor and Great Lakes Region). These entities (and their recently remolded joint sub-executive body for South Sudan, UNMISS-Plus and RPF) comprise a number of countries acting on one stance but whose implications is farfetched across individual multiplicities. As a landlocked state, isolation shall make it harder for Juba to pursue its external interests with ease and less cost. The citizens shall continue to suffer while persevering the mounting hardships or escaping to take refuge abroad, leaving behind a non-utilized virgin and empty precious land.
- **The TGoNU could be helped by the RPF to cantoned or assemble extra armed forces in agreed locations to screen them and put some of them under DDR programs, particularly those who are disqualified by the criteria set by Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) for creation of conventional National Defense Forces.** ARCISS Chapter II, Article (6.2) authorizes SDSR to “draw a team of local and international experts” to assist with best practices on this. The reformed National Defense Force could be turned into a conventional productive power for eradicating hunger and reducing poverty via large scale Agriculture, Forestry, Fishery and Mining, for example, with their commanders together with other TGoNU VIPs encouraged to make these a sporting activity to reduce luxury-related diseases and cut medical treatment costs abroad.
- **Enough is enough for too much militarism and senseless bloodshed in South Sudan. Our people needs the urgent dignity of peaceful life with giggling of happy children accompanied by ululations of joyful women and gratifying men!**

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■ **POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- Transform the foreign policy and diplomatic communication by adopting orthodoxy, repairing sour relations with many former friendly countries and knock doors of some countries for widening the horizon of mutual interests. This could be achieved through balanced and serious connections between political power, economic opportunities, people-to-people socialization and avoidance of tit-for-tat bullying or support for rebel groups in order to reduce suspicions and conspiratorial tensions. This has to match with 'Home-grown' conciliatory and just public policies, including national dignified actions that neutralize the threats against the sovereignty which should be predicated, first and foremost, on the following:
 1. *Protection of the population without discrimination,*
 2. *Undivided loyalty of the citizens to the state,*
 3. *Enforceability of government powers in all the jurisdictional territory ,*
 4. *Cooperation with the UN and other international and regional bodies based on treaties, mutual recognition and other legitimate obligations.*
 5. *Viability of the state and sustainability of its government among other nations.*
- **Avoid dangerous deadlocks and stick to ARCSS implementation while pursuing political, economic or security interests within the flexibilities and loopholes provided therein.** This would reduce the anarchy of emotional reaction on every thing, and also the possibility of seizure of power by a radical group with an aggressive assertive bloody agenda that might throw the baby out with the dirty birth while the elephant is in the room.
- **Conduct serious and quick undertakings on security sector reforms,** done intelligently and jointly with regional actors and international community, especially the friendly countries whose good faith for South Sudan is not doubtful. Ethiopia, Rwanda and Botswana could be approached and engaged constructively for this urgent assistance.

Cont.

- **Accord RPF the benefit of doubt by engaging its actors constructively so as to reach a win-win understanding and joint operation, especially with the NSS and Police of South Sudan.** In case RPF fails to achieve its mission later, the government should have already done its preemptive lobby regionally and internationally to let it exit the country in peace without provoking military confrontation or diplomatic hitch. While cooperating, the TGoNU should not forget that motives of the intervening actors can't be detached from internal reality and interests of their respective countries vis-a-vis the host state. Nothing much can be changed but **to ensure that South Sudan interest is jointly included in UNMISS-Plus and RPF Mandates via collaboration with TGoNU Mandate.**
- **Pay keen attention to both local and international public opinions and petitions about South Sudan and scrutinize the accurate truth for prudent and timely actionable decisions that will not risk the country to disintegrate and get into undesirable abyss of vicious cycle of violence.** Since the sympathy and goodwill of the regional and international community has diminished towards political leaders of South Sudan who wield monopoly of violence, it is only patience and honesty in resolving power conflicts that could enable the TGoNU to regain the value of human relations in a globalized world whose superpowers opt a use of disproportional brutal response when pushed to corner of non-cooperation against their interests.
- All is not hopeless for South Sudan because the opportunity of rising and forging a better way forward is available. **The RPF and UNMISS-Plus mandate could be effectively used to work in favor of the people of South Sudan and the TGoNU,** but only by employing smartly and strategically the passwords of Engagement, Dialogue and Cooperation. **Showcase the exceptional credible protection capability and professionalism demonstrated by National Security Service (NSS) and South Sudan Police Service (SSPS), especially the diplomatic police,** and use these as TGoNU's negotiations strength for justifying a joint venture with UNMISS-Plus and RPF.

CONCLUSION

Calculate Consequences in Advance! Dread unforeseen Backlashes of Irrational Actions!




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


❑ When Your House Is On Fire!

❑ Accept External Rescue! Argue for Internal Matters Later!



WHERE IS OUR EAGLE VALUES AND NATIONALISM CONSCIENCE?



- ❖ Has Our Republic glorified God for the gift of precious land of natural abundance?
- ❖ Are we not ashamed of saluting the martyrs whose blood cemented the national foundation of our Republic?
- ❖ Have Our leaders not failed to honor the constitutional ‘social contract’ to protect and secure the nation from intractable wars, insecurity, fear, inflation, hunger, poverty, diseases, rapes, wounds, deaths, displacement, refuge and trauma?
- ❖ How will God continue to bless South Sudan if political will and people’s love and harmony are not maximized by prudent decisions and actions by all?
- ❖ **The Undeserved Torturous Impasse the Republic of South Sudan has Undergone Should Prick Consciences of our War-Like Leaders and Compel them to Retreat, Reflect and Reconsider their Standings within the Community of Peaceful and Stable Nations who have Learnt to Live Dignified with Humanized Aspirations and Pride in their Designated Jurisdictional Territories!**